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: Public Corruption in Helena, Arkansas: Analysis and Recommendatio

Introduction∗
In Spring 2014, Mississippi Delta Project’s Economic Development team researched the
causes of and possible solutions for the high crime rate in Helena-West Helena,
Arkansas (“Helena”). In connection with this research, the team conducted a series of
interviews with Helena citizens and community leaders. The team’s research and
interviews revealed that recent events had frayed the community’s faith in its public
institutions. In October 2011, the now well-known federal drug investigation called
Operation Delta Blues culminated with the arrest of five local law enforcement officials
on charges of attempted racketeering.1 During its investigation, the Economic
Development team learned of additional allegations of mismanagement and wrongdoing
by public officials, including a pattern of dismissing criminal cases for lack of a timely
trial which enabled alleged criminals to walk free, and repeated ethics violations by at
least one Phillips County judge. The team decided to build upon its previous report,
released in Fall 2014, which focused on crime-reduction strategies for Helena, by
offering a more pointed analysis and strategies to address these problems of corruption.
The goal of this report is to provide policy-makers in Helena with options for addressing
corruption in order to reduce the negative economic impact that stem from such
corruption and increase community trust in public institutions.

Helena: Economic Context
Helena is a town in northwestern Arkansas located on the western banks of the
Mississippi River, about seventy miles southwest of Memphis, Tennessee. Helena is the
county seat of Phillips County. As of 2013, the county had about 20,399 residents,2 of
whom about 12,000 live in Helena.3 Once a successful port town that exported
Arkansas’ agricultural and manufactured goods to the rest of the U.S., Helena
experienced the effects of globalization and mechanization in the second half of the
twentieth century. This resulted in a loss of industry, economy and jobs that Helena still
has yet to recover from and caused detrimental effects to the community.4 As of 2013,
This report was prepared by Joe Milner and Tara Norris, members of the Harvard Law School
Mississippi Delta Project under the supervision of Desta Reff, Harvard Delta Clinical Fellow. The following
students from the Harvard Mississippi Delta Project were involved in researching and drafting the report:
Joe Breen, Chris Burkhalter, Linda Liu, Mike Mattheiss, Grace Signorelli, April Wang, and Ian Wells.
1
Ashley Blackstone, Press Conference Names Helena-West Helena Officers Arrested, THV 11 (Oct. 11,
2011, 5:09 PM), http://www.thv11.com/news/article/176587/2/Press-conference-names-Helena-WestHelena-officers-arrested.
2
Phillips County, Arkansas, QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Feb. 5, 2015, 1:12 PM),
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/05/05107.html.
3
Helena-West Helena (city) QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Feb. 5, 2015, 1:12 PM),
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/05/0531190.html.
4
See Luke Jones, Quest for Helena Port Tenants Took 20 Years, ARKANSAS BUSINESS (April 29, 2013
12:00 AM), http://www.arkansasbusiness.com/article/92185/quest-for-helena-port-tenants-took-20years?page=all; see also Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir. 1982).
∗
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over 40% of Helena’s residents lived below the federal poverty line.5 Helena’s public
institutions have failed to reverse this economic decline and, as highlighted above, have
contributed to Helena’s problems by tolerating and facilitating corruption.

Corruption
“Corruption” is traditionally defined as “the abuse of public office for private gain.”6
Corruption encompasses a wide range of behavior, including the acceptance of bribes,
the use of public resources for personal reasons, or selective enforcement of the law.7
While corruption may vary in form, its economic effects are universal. According to the
World Bank, corruption adds 10% to the cost of doing business across the world8 and
has declared it to be “. . . among the greatest obstacles to economic and social
development,”9 as it skews incentive structures for economic actors, which can lead to
the inefficient allocation of scarce resources. When corruption creates transactional
costs for businesses, they may choose to operate in other markets that are free of these
costs. Indeed, businesses have other reasons to avoid markets that are affected by
corruption: first, corruption creates the risk of future prosecution and penalties; second,
corruption increases business uncertainty, either by increasing the likelihood of future
criminal liability for businesses that appease corrupt actors, or by placing law-abiding
businesses at a comparative disadvantage relative to businesses that do engage in
corrupt behavior.
The Economic Development team did not discover any direct evidence of corruption
involving legitimate private-sector businesses. However, the rule of law and democratic
legitimacy are perhaps most grievously injured when neither citizens nor businesses
can rely upon the integrity of judicial and law enforcement officers. When legal systems
are corrupt, citizens tend to perceive their social environment and the distribution of
social goods as unfair.10 Entrenched corruption of the public sector, including the
judiciary and law enforcement, contributes to institutional inertia and prevents market

5

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 3.
Anwar Shah, Corruption and Decentralized Public Governance 2 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 3824,
2006).
7
See BERTRAM I. SPECTOR ET AL., U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, ANTICORRUPTION
ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK 2 (2009).
8
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ET AL., The Business Case against Corruption 1,
http://www.weforum.org/pdf/paci/BusinessCaseAgainstCorruption.pdf.
9
Corruption Hunters Rally for Action Against Fraud, WORLD BANK (Dec. 6, 2010),
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22783187~pagePK:64257043~piP
K:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html?cid=EXT_FBWB_D_EXT.
10
See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GOVERNMENT AT A GLANCE 2013 22
(2013).
6
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reforms.11 Fortunately, studies show that reforms favoring transparency and judicial
independence create economic growth.12
As discussed above, the Economic Development team encountered instances and
allegations of corruption in local law enforcement and the court system. The abuses
uncovered by Operation Delta Blues fall within a traditional understanding of corruption;
the law enforcement officials who were charged in connection with Operation Delta
Blues admitted to accepting money from drug dealers in return for the officers’
protection, using their public offices for private gain.13 In interviews, the Economic
Development team also heard allegations that Helena-West Helena police officers have
engaged in uses of excessive force against citizens.
Signs of corruption also have appeared in the court system. For example, one of the
currently presiding judges in Phillips County has been sanctioned repeatedly for ethics
violations over the course of the last eight years but has managed to retain his office.14
The court system’s disorganization provides opportunities for additional abuses. The
court system has proven unable to manage its caseload; for instance, compared to
criminal cases in Arkansas state courts overall, criminal cases on the Phillips County
circuit court’s docket are nearly twice as likely to have been pending for more than two
years.15 Many of these cases have been dismissed without a trial. This process
potentially returns criminals to the street and undermines the rule of law. Further, the
court system’s inability to administer justice on a routine basis undoubtedly undermines
the public’s trust in the local government and the rule of law.
This report details three broad policy recommendations in order to reduce corruption
and restore trust in public institutions in Helena. First, Helena should consider
implementing the use of body cameras by law enforcement officials. When
accompanied by clear policies and strict privacy safeguards, body cameras can
enhance transparency and reduce negative confrontations between police officers and
citizens. Second, this report recommends that local courts should consider adopting
case-flow management strategies. These strategies aim to increase courts’ efficiency in
reviewing cases by reducing the amount of time and resources spent on each case.
Third, Helena should consider proposing or supporting amendments to Arkansas’ rules
governing judicial elections and campaign finance. Together, these recommendations
11

Edgardo Buscaglia, Judicial Corruption in Developing Countries: Its Causes and Economic
Consequences, HOOVER INSTITUTION (Jul. 1, 1999), http://www.hoover.org/research/judicial-corruptiondeveloping-countries-its-causes-and-economic-consequences.
12
See, e.g., Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country
Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators 23 (CESifo Working Paper No. 906, 2003).
13
See, e.g., Three Defendants Plead Guilty in Operation Delta Blues, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
(Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.fbi.gov/littlerock/press-releases/2012/three-defendants-plead-guilty-inoperation-delta-blues (describing the guilty plea of former Helena-West Helena police officer Robert
Rogers).
14
Ark. Jud. Discipline and Disability Comm’n. v. Simes, 381 S.W.3d 764, 779 (2011).
15
ARK. JUDICIARY, SUMMARY OF FIRST CIRCUIT ACTIVE CRIMINAL CHARGES DURING THE DATES OF
01/01/2013–12/31/2013 (2014), available at
https://courts.arkansas.gov/sites/default/files/tree/1st%20Circuit%20Criminal_0.pdf.

5
Published by eGrove, 2015

5

Delta Directions: Publications, Art. 20 [2015]

seek to address weaknesses in Helena’s public institutions and provide suggestions
that these institutions can undertake to build community trust.

I. Law Enforcement Recommendations
Building trust between police and the community is essential in order to reduce crime.
The relationship between the police and low-income, minority communities is often
characterized by distrust and fear; indeed, race and income are among the best
predictors of evaluations of police performance.16 Half of black citizens report having
very little or no confidence in their local police, while less than 11% express a great deal
of confidence in their police.17 When people do not trust that their communities can
solve problems, they tend not to report crimes, and criminal activity is allowed to
continue without police intervention.18 Black citizens are five times more likely to report
mistreatment by police officers.19 Additionally, low-income citizens are more likely to be
distrustful of police than high-income citizens.20 In Helena, 75% of the population is
black, and over 40% of the population lives below the federal poverty line.21 As a result,
many of Helena’s citizens are likely to have poor perceptions of law enforcement, even
in the absence of wrongdoing by law enforcement officials. These negative perceptions
may already hinder Helena citizens from reporting crime, enabling criminals to evade
the police and continue to contribute to Helena’s growing crime problems.
Recent events in Helena provide additional support for citizens’ distrust of police and
threaten to further erode public trust in law enforcement. In October 2011, the FBI-led
Operation Delta Blues arrested 70 people in Phillips County on drug-related offenses,
including five law enforcement officers, all of whom either plead guilty or were
convicted.22 These officers accounted for about 12% of the full-time law enforcement
officers in Helena and Phillips County.
Establishing strong community trust and model police behavior are essential because
both public perception and police behavior can have real effects on crime. The police
rely on citizen reporting of crime in order to identify and apprehend criminals. According
to the 2013 National Crime Victimization Survey, only 45.6% of violent crimes and
16

See Brown & Benedict, Perceptions of the Police: Past Findings, Methodological Issues, Conceptual
Issues and Policy implications, 25 POLICING: AN INT’L J. OF POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 543, 547, 550
(2002), available at http://www.observatoriodeseguranca.org/files/p543.pdf.
17
Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Race, Class, and Perceptions of Discrimination by the Police, 45
CRIME & DELINQUENCY, 494, 498 (1999).
18
See Robert C. Davis & Nicole J. Harrison, Willingness to Report Crimes: The Role of Ethnic Group
Membership and Community Efficacy, 49 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 564, 577 (2003).
19
Weitzer & Tuch, supra note 17, at 502.
20
Brown & Benedict, supra note 16, at 550.
21
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.
22
Helena Ex-Officer’s Drug Conviction Upheld, THV 11 (May 8, 2014, 6:25 PM),
http://www.thv11.com/story/news/local/2014/05/08/marlene-kalb-conviction-upheld/8856439/; see also
Fourth Police Officer Pleads Guilty in Operation Delta Blues, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Mar. 16,
2012), http://www.fbi.gov/littlerock/press-releases/2012/fourth-police-officer-pleads-guilty-in-operationdelta-blues.
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36.1% of property crimes were reported to the police.23 While in many cases victims do
not report crimes because they find alternative means to resolve the issue, 20% of the
unreported crimes nationwide between 2006 and 2010 were unreported because the
victim believed the police would not or could not help.24
A recent survey in Pennsylvania illustrated the link between public trust and reporting
of crimes. In the survey, Philadelphia residents’ responses indicated that, if they were
victims of crimes, they would either hesitate to contact the police or decide not to
contact the police at all. In contrast, residents of nearby counties indicated that they
were much more willing to contact the police to report a crime. Philadelphia residents
also exhibited a confidence level in police that was 22% lower than that of residents in
nearby counties.25 Philadelphia residents appeared to evaluate police integrity and
competence less well than their county counterparts. Taken together, these results
reveal that residents who distrust law enforcement’s ability and willingness to enforce
the law professionally may be less likely to report crimes. When these crimes go
unreported, law enforcement cannot identify and apprehend criminals, and criminals
remain on the streets. Without community trust, the police cannot succeed in fighting
crime in Helena. In order to reverse this trend, Helena must implement changes in law
enforcement policy that fight corruption and restore the public’s trust in the integrity of
Helena’s law enforcement. This report recommends that Helena (1) adopts the use of
body cameras by law enforcement officials, including clear policies regarding when and
how the cameras should be used and (2) implements community policing strategies in
order to build community trust.

A. Body Cameras as a Tool to Build Community Trust
In order to build public trust, police departments need to increase transparency and
accountability for their behavior. By implementing video surveillance of officer activities,
police departments can better police citizens and themselves. People who are aware
that someone might be watching become more prone to socially acceptable behavior
and a heightened need to comply to rules.26 For example, many schools have installed
security cameras to incentivize students to behave in a socially acceptable manner;
installation has correlated with reduced school-related deaths, sexual attacks, and
weapons on school grounds.27 Implementing video surveillance in public areas has
been shown to correlate with a 51% decrease in vehicle-related property crime.28 In

23

BUREAU JUST. STAT., U.S. DEPT. OF JUST.,CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 2013 7 (2014), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv13.pdf.
24
Nearly 3.4 Million Violent Crimes Per Year Went Unreported to Police from 2006 to 2010, BUREAU JUST.
STAT. (Aug. 9, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/vnrp0610pr.cfm.
25
Id.
26
TONY FARRAR,, SELF-AWARENESS TO BEING WATCHED AND SOCIALLY-DESIRABLE BEHAVIOR: A FIELD
EXPERIMENT ON THE EFFECT OF BODY-WORN CAMERAS ON POLICE USE-OF-FORCE, POLICE FOUNDATION 3
(2013).
27
J. Scott Granberg-Rademacker et al., Do School Violence Policies Matter? An Empirical Analysis of
Four Approaches to Reduce School Violence, 4 SW. J. CRIM. JUST. 4, 11 (2007).
28
FARRAR, supra note 26, at 4.
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addition, studies have shown that speed cameras reduce speeding by 65% and serious
traffic accidents by 44%.29
Body cameras are highly effective in influencing both police and citizen behavior.
Following the Rodney King incident, in which an unarmed black male was beaten by
police, the Police Foundation ran a yearlong study in the Rialto Police Department
(RPD) in which they concluded that placing body cameras on police officers would
reduce the frequency of use of force. Their research found that police shifts that used
body cameras used force half as many times as police shifts without cameras30 and
officers used weapons only when physically threatened. Conversely, in police shifts
without cameras, officers used weapons in 5 out of 17 incidents in which they were not
physically threatened.31 When police used body cameras and had a physical
confrontation with a citizen, the officers never initiated physical contact, while in shifts
without body cameras, officers initiated physical contact in 4 out of 17 instances.
Compared to the previous year, the RPD’s reduced their use of force by 250% and
complaints to the police department decreased from 28 to 3.32 By reducing police use of
force, body cameras help the police eliminate negative interactions with the public and
thereby help to repair community trust in law enforcement.
In the wake of controversial citizen deaths at the hands of police officers, body cameras
have become a widely discussed tool for improving relations between law enforcement
and their communities. Last August, Officer Darren Wilson of Ferguson, Missouri, killed
Michael Brown, an unarmed eighteen-year-old, during a violent confrontation. The
encounter gave rise to conflicting eyewitness accounts. In response, commentators
pointed to body cameras as tools that can be used to establish an unbiased record of
police encounters with citizens.33 Local, state, and federal officials quickly proposed
policy solutions that incorporated the use of body cameras to reduce police use of force
and increase accountability. In September, the St. Louis County Police began outfitting
all of its 465 patrol officers with body cameras with the goal of reducing police abuse.34
In December, a Missouri state legislator also proposed a bill that would require all police
officers in the state to wear body cameras.35 At the federal level, the White House
responded to the events in Ferguson by proposing the Body Worn Camera Partnership

29

Id.
Id. at 8 (also noting that “the rate of use of force incidents per 1,000 contacts was reduced by 2.5 times
compared to the 12 months prior to the experimental period”).
31
Id. at 9; see also id. at 6 (noting that these statistics are based on officers’ use-of-force incident reports,
not independent reporting).
32
Id. at 8.
33
See, e.g., German Lopez, Michael Brown's family said police should adopt body cameras. They're
right., VOX (Nov. 24, 2014, 10:50 PM), http://www.vox.com/2014/8/16/6023481/michael-mike-brownferguson-body-cameras.
34
Paul Hampel, In Ferguson, residents begin training cameras on police, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Sep.
20 2014, 5:29 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/in-ferguson-residents-begin-trainingcameras-on-police/article_5e6b6cef-8a85-5bcd-87d6-6019390634aa.html.
35
Dave Hon, Proposed bill would require body cams on officers, ST. JOSEPH NEWS-PRESSNOW (Dec. 26,
2014, 8:21 AM), http://www.newspressnow.com/news/local_news/article_127c4902-c07b-51e9-9c6fba4f208c81f5.html.
30
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Program.36 If approved by Congress, the program will offer $75 million in funding to help
purchase 50,000 body cameras across the country.
Body cameras create additional benefits for law enforcement. Because body cameras
record officers’ behavior, body cameras can also assist police departments in
monitoring the behavior of their officers. This is especially important in Helena-West
Helena following the events and convictions of Operation Delta Blues. If recorded
footage shows an officer abusing his powers, the department can take immediate
corrective action. For example, in Phoenix, the police department fired an officer after
the department reviewed footage revealing “repeated instances of verbal abuse,
profanity, and threats against members of the public.”37 Even if body cameras do not
capture direct police misbehavior, they may still deter such behavior. In the first year
police adopted body cameras in Mesa, Arizona, use of force complaints decreased by
75% and departmental complaints decreased by 40% from the previous year.38
Because they know their actions are being recorded and wish to avoid negative
outcomes like disciplinary actions, officers are more likely adhere more closely to model
behavior. Further, by reducing complaints, body cameras also may help decrease
litigation against law enforcement or provide greater clarity during litigation. 39 By
eliminating litigation entirely or reducing the number of hours spent on litigation, body
cameras can help to generate cost savings for the community.40 Many police
departments also use body cameras in training exercises with their officers. These
video recordings enable departments to internally observe, evaluate, and provide more
effective suggestions and recommendations to their officers.41
Recognizing the value and utility of body cameras, more police departments have
begun to implement body camera programs. In response to a 2013 survey by the Police
Executive Research Forum (PERF), over 25% of the police departments surveyed
indicated that they had adopted body cameras to some degree.42 In the same year, the
New York Police Department (NYPD) adopted body cameras in five precincts after a
judge ruled that their stop-and-frisk practice was unconstitutional.43 In September, the
Metropolitan Police Department of D.C began a six-month body camera pilot program

36

Andrea Peterson, President Obama wants to spend $75 million to buy police bodycams, WASHINGTON
POST (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/12/01/president-obamawants-to-spend-75-million-to-buy-police-bodycams/.
37
LINDSAY MILLER ET AL., IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS
LEARNED, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 8 (2014), available at
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/472014912134715246869.pdf.
38
RYAN STOKES ET AL., END OF PROGRAM EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: ON-OFFICER BODY CAMERA
SYSTEM 1 (2013), available at http://issuu.com/leerankin6/docs/final_axon_flex_evaluation_12-3-13-.
39
MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 34.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 7.
42
Id. at 2.
43
Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, NY TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-practice-violated-rights-judge-rules.html.
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and believes that the program eventually will reduce the number of complaints filed
against police officers on an annual basis by 80%.44
Helena would specifically benefit from implementing a body camera program in either or
both of the Helena-West Helena Police Department and the Phillips County Sheriff’s
Department. Due in part to the corrupt behavior of officers exposed by Operation Delta
Blues, law enforcement in Helena and Phillips County suffers from a lack of public
confidence in the departments’ integrity. Body cameras will help to address both officer
behavior and public perception of that behavior. Officers will be less likely to act
inappropriately if their actions are filmed, and the law enforcement departments can use
collected video recordings to review officer behavior and provide impartial records to the
public in the event of complaints against officers. If Helena properly sets up a body
camera program by implementing and enforcing clear policies and procedures, Helena
can achieve these goals at a manageable cost.
Helena’s unique set of resources and limitations presents its own challenges in
implementing body cameras. This recommendation will examine the financial,
technological, and policy concerns of body cameras for Helena while anticipating
potential benefits and negatives of implementation.
Implementation in Helena

In order to provide the greatest benefits to Helena, implementation of police body
cameras must include (i) a well thought-out plan to implement body camera usage and
(ii) forward planning to account for and control costs.
i. A strong technological infrastructure and policy is a necessity to create an effective system.

In order to properly implement body cameras it is critical that a police department has a
very strong procedural system in place.45 Without safeguards, cameras may be used in
an abusive manner. Given public mistrust of the police and the abuses of police powers
that led to officers’ convictions following Operation Delta Blues, Helena should pay
special attention to establishing and maintaining safeguards. This analysis will look at
basic elements of camera usage and video storage before examining precautionary
policies to prevent misuse.
a. Camera Usage

Body cameras are typically worn on the chest or lapel or around the ear. 46 They can be
moved to other spots on the officer depending on policy. Head-mounted units offer the
advantage of recording events from the officer’s point of view. Head-mounted cameras
also reduce distortion that occurs when the officer is running or fighting. The Police
44

Mike Debonis & Victoria St. Martin, D.C. police will wear body cameras as part of pilot program,
WASHINGTON POST (Sep. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/dc-police-will-wear-bodycameras-as-part-of-pilot-program/2014/09/24/405f7f5c-43e7-11e4-b437-1a7368204804_story.html.
45
See MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 40.
46
NAT’L INST. JUST., A PRIMER ON BODY-WORN CAMERAS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, 4 (2012) available at
https://www.justnet.org/pdf/00-Body-Worn-Cameras-508.pdf.
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Executive Research Forum (PERF) recommends that police departments require
officers to keep the camera in a certain location.47 Camera models vary in terms of
video quality, night recording ability, battery life, audio recording, and storage limits.48 A
Department of Homeland Security focus group recommended that law enforcement
adopt body cameras that meet minimum technical specifications.49 These specifications
include a resolution of 640 x 480, a frame rate of 25 frames per second, a battery life of
three hours, data storage for three hours of continuous recording, and a low lux rating or
an infrared illuminator. Helena should evaluate camera models in the context of their
intended use and weigh their benefits against unit cost.
b. Video Storage

Video storage means and limits vary greatly based upon the selected policy and
available resources. Typically video is stored either on an in-house server or an online
cloud database.50 An online cloud database may eliminate upfront server costs and
outsource IT issues but will require payment of ongoing fees. For example,
Evidence.com provides cloud data storage for law enforcement and is used by police
departments in Salt Lake City, Utah; Rialto, California; and Mesa, Arizona, among
others.51 Evidence.com offers multiple tiers of service with monthly fees ranging from
$15 to $55 per user.52 Storing data in-house will eliminate monthly fees but will require
Helena to purchase server units and potentially hire personnel to manage the in-house
system. Helena also will need to establish a video retention policy that specifies how
long footage must be retained. Storage of videos must comply with state evidentiary
rules and be properly protected.53 PERF recommends that departments classify videos
upon upload and be flagged as “evidentiary” if they relate to an investigation or capture
a “confrontational encounter” with a member of the public.54 All other videos are then
only stored temporarily. PERF notes that “60 or 90-day holding periods are common.”55
Ashland, Virginia is a small rural town of 7,000 citizens that has adopted police body
cameras.56 Their video storage lasts 45 days unless the video is needed for evidence.57
Shorter holding periods would cut storage costs. However, in developing its retention
policy Helena also should consider Arkansas public disclosure laws and the benefits

47

MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 39.
NAT’L INST. JUST., supra note 46, at 6.
49
See U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., WEARABLE CAMERA SYSTEMS (AEL REFERENCE NUMBER 13LE-00-SURV)
1 (2012), available at http://storage.vievu.com/MediaKit/Wearable-Camera-Systems_SAVER.pdf.
50
MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 15.
51
NAT’L INST. JUST., supra note 46, at 33.
52
Pricing & Purchase Information, EVIDENCE.COM, http://www.evidence.com/pricing-info/ (last visited Dec.
31, 2014).
53
MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 16.
54
Id. at 43.
55
Matt Pearce, Growing use of police body cameras raises privacy concerns, LA TIMES (Sept. 27, 2014),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-body-cameras-20140927-story.html.
56
Shelby Mertens, Police License Plate Readers, Cell Phone Tracking and the Fourth Amendment, VA.
FREE CITIZEN (Sept. 9, 2014), http://virginiafreecitizen.com/2014/09/09/police-license-plate-readers-cellphone-tracking-fourth-amendment/.
57
Id.
48
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and drawbacks to making video footage available to the public for longer periods of
time.58
c. Safeguards to Prevent Abuse

In developing a body camera policy, the Helena police department should carefully
consider how to establish a series of safeguards to prevent abuse. Recorded video
brings about privacy concerns in every step of the process.59 First, the policy should
address when and where police should be allowed to record. These parameters will
clarify general expectations for the cameras’ operation and limit officers’ discretion for
operating cameras to specific situations in which video recording may violate citizens’
privacy rights. Many departments utilize a policy in which cameras must be turned off
when entering private homes or while interviewing witnesses that do not give their
express consent to be recorded.60 Seeking to balance the benefits of body cameras
against the complications of sensitive situations, these policies seek to respect privacy
rights and provide officers with some discretion in conducting investigative work. Other
potential situations when restriction of camera use may be advised would include
victims of sexual crime or others of a highly private nature.61 Helena should consider
adopting a policy that requires officers to have their cameras on at all times during calls
for service and encounters with citizens except when entering homes or when a citizen
being interviewed has requested that the interview not be filmed. This policy would
ensure both that officers are accountable for recording most of their policing activities
and that citizens’ privacy rights are respected. The Body Worn Video Steering Group
(“BWVSG”), an organization created to support public debate about body-worn
cameras, has published a template policy for police use of body cameras.62 Helena
should consider consulting BWVSG’s template policy when developing its own policy.
Helena’s body camera policy also should provide strict rules regarding video upload and
storage. According to PERF, department policy should strictly forbid officers from
uploading body camera footage for personal use or for posting on public or social media
websites.63 Retrieval and viewing of recordings should occur only under certain
conditions, such as a complaint or arrest, and should follow a procedure outlined in the
department policy.64 By establishing a clear procedure, the department can eliminate
opportunities for abusing access to recordings.
Because body-worn cameras are in the possession of officers while officers are on
patrol, opportunities may arise where officers are tempted to tamper with the cameras
and recordings. For example, the chief of the Daytona Beach police department
reported that an officer repeatedly turned off his camera when encountering members of
58

MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 64.
Id. at 11.
60
See Id. at 12, 15.
61
See Id. at 18.
62
See Procedures and Guidelines, BODY WORN VIDEO STEERING GROUP,
http://www.bwvsg.com/resources/procedures-and-guidelines/ (last visited July 9, 2015).
63
MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 46.
64
Id. at 45.
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the public.65 In addition to establishing strict policies and expectations for officer
operation of body cameras, Helena may want to consider purchasing cameras with antitampering features.66 Such features can help to ensure the integrity of the body camera
program. Anti-tampering features and policies may also be necessary in order to ensure
that recordings can be admitted as evidence.67
d. The financial cost of body cameras will be substantial for Helena.

The financial cost of body cameras is perhaps the most important element in
consideration for municipalities. The Helena city council and police department and the
Phillips County sheriff’s department have limited funding and must allocate their
resources to the most pertinent issues. Considering this, body cameras may be a
luxury that Helena cannot afford out of its own pockets. However, federal grant funding
may be available which could assist in minimizing the overall costs. The Department of
Justice (DOJ) offers funding to assist local law enforcement through two programs. First
is the DOJ’s Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program which
offers funding to local governments for a variety of criminal justice needs, including
equipment and technology improvement programs.68 In 2014, Helena used JAG funding
to offset the cost of the police department’s mobile analytics software.69 The police
department could easily re-approach JAG additional funding to support this venture.
Second, the DOJ’s Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Office also provides
funding for equipment purchases through its COPS Technology Program.70 These
funding sources should help make body cameras a financially feasible option for
Helena.
The total cost associated with implementing body cameras includes a number of
expenses. Camera purchase is the primary upfront cost. Camera prices range from
around $120 to $2,000 per camera.71 Most agencies tend to spend around $800 to
65

Id. at 8.
See MICHAEL D. WHITE, OFFICER OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES, POLICE OFFICER BODYWORN CAMERAS: ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 12 (2014) (describing camera models
with anti-tampering features), available at
https://www.ojpdiagnosticcenter.org/sites/default/files/spotlight/download/Police%20Officer%20BodyWorn%20Cameras.pdf
files/spotlight/download/Police%20Officer%20Body-Worn%20Cameras.pdf
67
Craig E. Ferrell, The Future Is Here: How Police Officers’ Videos Protect Officers and Departments, 80
THE POLICE CHIEF 16–18 (2013), available at
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=3139&issue
_id=102013.
68
BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE, EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG) PROGRAM FY
2014 LOCAL SOLICITATION 4 (2014), available at https://www.bja.gov/Funding/14JAGLocalSol.pdf (last
visited Dec. 31, 2014).
69
Helena-West Helena Technology Enhancement Project, U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE,
http://grants.ojp.usdoj.gov:85/selector/awardDetail?awardNumber=2014-DJ-BX-0860&
fiscalYear=2014&applicationNumber=2014-H4054-AR-DJ&programOffice=BJA&po=BJA (last visited July
9, 2015).
70
COPS Technology Grants, COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICE SERVICES,
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Item=58 (last visited July 9, 2015).
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MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 32.
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$1,200 per camera, according to PERF.72 Data storage can be more expensive,
although the cost varies in relation to the number of cameras and the amount of time
the cameras are used. Depending on how often officers are filming, cloud storage
space for the camera recordings can be very expensive. For example, one department
“spent $67,500 to purchase 50 cameras and will spend approximately $111,000 to store
the video on a cloud for two years.”73 Helena’s police department is much smaller and
would only require around 10 cameras for the use of all on-duty officers. If Helena’s
costs were exactly proportional to the costs in the example above, a body camera
program in Helena would be somewhere around one-fifth of the previously stated price
for a 50-camera unit. Thus, the two-year cost for Helena could be around $35,000 to
$40,000. Helena could reduce this cost by purchasing less expensive cameras and
establishing a policy that officers should turn on their cameras only when interacting
with members of the public and thereby decreasing the amount of storage needed.
The final major cost to consider is the administration of the body camera program.
Officers will need to be trained in how to properly use the devices. If Helena decides to
manage the video storage itself, a few individuals will need extensive knowledge of the
required computer systems and will need to spend substantial time reviewing videos
and uploading data. Otherwise, Helena will need to pay a third-party vendor to manage
the video storage. Determining the exact monetary cost of this time spent is too difficult
to estimate for the purposes of this report but very important to consider when creating
a plan to purchase and implement body cameras. Helena should consider these costs
alongside the benefits of body cameras when determining whether to pursue such a
program.
Helena might also be well served to begin with a pilot program that distributes cameras
only to a subset of officers. For example, Helena could assign cameras to 5 police
officers over a six-month period to evaluate the effects the cameras may have in
Helena. This approach would minimize the upfront cost of camera purchases and would
give the police department time to adapt to the system. Any issues with implementation
or problems may be discovered before fully outfitting the police force. If, after the
conclusion of the six-month pilot period, the department recognizes that the program
may benefit from changes to its policies and procedures, it could implement a follow-up
six-month trial period to test these changes before launching the full program. Many
towns have begun with pilot programs before launching a larger body camera program
after successful experimentation. In April, the small rural town of Daleville, Indiana,
purchased seven body cameras to be used by its police force.74 The town has now
decided to expand the program with additional cameras.75 A similar pilot approach to
body cameras may be a great option to make body cameras affordable and effective for
Helena.
72

Id.
Id.
74
Derrik Thomas, Daleville Police Department cameras reduce discrepancies, RTV6 (Aug. 20, 2014, 8:45
PM), http://www.theindychannel.com/news/local-news/daleville-police-department-cameras-reducediscrepancies.
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Final Recommendation for Body Camera Implementation

This report recommends that the Helena Police Department equip its officers with body
cameras as a measure to increase accountability in local law enforcement as well as
community trust. In connection with implementing a body camera program, Helena also
should:
1. Store its video footage on an online cloud database to eliminate upfront server
costs and outsource IT issues.
2. Purchase cameras with anti-tampering features to prevent officers from deleting
video footage.
3. Select a few police department staff to complete all uploads and review videos.
4. Create a procedure to retrieve and view recordings under select condition such
as complaint or arrest.
5. Establish safeguards to prevent abuse. Develop a policy in which cameras must
be turned off when entering private homes or while interviewing witnesses that
do not give their express consent to be recorded. Camera use should also be
restricted in situations of sexual crime.
B. Community Policing
Community policing is an approach to law enforcement that emphasizes cooperation
between police officers and the community.76 Community policing emphasizes the
connection between police officers and the communities they serve, focusing on
problem-solving and integrating law enforcement officers into their communities.77
Community policing is proactive: by conceiving of their job as problem-solving instead of
merely responding to incidents, law enforcement officers are able to better understand
and respond to the needs of their communities. Polls of communities in which law
enforcement have switched to a community policing approach demonstrate that it aids
“community relations and trust in police,” including “satisfaction with policing” and
perception of police “legitimacy.”78
One important aspect of community policing is “geographic ownership”: that is, the
assignment of officers to particular patrol areas that they “own.” Within those geographic
areas, law enforcement should have flexibility to determine the best way to identify and
address problems.79 To encourage strong relationships between officers and their areas
76

BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, Understanding Community Policing: A Framework for Action, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 15-16 (1994), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/commp.pdf; Community
policing was described in the Mississippi Delta Project’s previous report, Crime Reduction in Helena,
Arkansas: Analysis and Recommendations, at pp. 9–11.
77
Does Community Policing Work?, POLICEMAG.COM (Dec. 1, 2005)
http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/2005/12/does-community-policing-work.aspx.
78
Charlotte Gill et al., Community-oriented policing: a systematic review, 10 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL
CRIMNOLOGY 399, 400 (2014), available at
http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/627/art%253A10.1007%252Fs11292-014-9210y.pdf?auth66=1410647077_073366a2713645d16d2995a856884702&ext=.pdf.
79
Nadine Connell et al., Can a Community Policing Initiative Reduce Serious Crime? 11 POLICE
QUARTERLY 127, 134 (2008).
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of the community, law enforcement officers should be assigned a permanent beat when
possible.80 As they become acquainted with residents, officers will be better able to
work with community organizations to engage in problem-solving activities like cleaning
up neglected areas—which has both crime-reduction and other community benefits—
and organizing neighborhood watches and other mechanisms to prevent and address
crime.81
Community policing is a two-way street: law enforcement officers must engage with
community members, and police departments should have a mechanism to allow
community members to reach out to them. Technology can help ease the burden of
engaging with law enforcement, especially in a largely rural community like Helena. For
example, social media or “online police reporting” systems can be established to allow
citizens to report non-emergency criminal behavior.82 Moreover, online resources can
also be used to collect feedback about police perception of the Helena police force and
the community’s priorities.83

II. Judicial System Recommendations
Caseflow Management
A. Introduction

Another problem that has led to increased public corruption and distrust in the justice
system is inefficient and backlogged courts. The struggles of the Phillips County courts
to deal fairly and efficiently with its overloaded docket has hamstrung Helena’s ability to
put criminal offenders behind bars and contributed to the erosion of public trust in the
criminal justice system. In July 2012, 44% of the criminal cases on the Phillips County
circuit court’s docket had been pending for more than two years, compared with a
statewide average of 27% in 2011.84 The court dealt with this extreme overload by
holding a one-time emergency special session and dropping more than 200 felony
cases. 85 However, by the end of 2013, 48% of criminal charges on Phillips County’s
docket had been pending for more than two years, and the total number of charges

80

Allison Chappell, The Philosophical Versus Actual Adoption of Community Policing: A Case Study, 34
CRIM. JUST. REVIEW 5, 7 (2009).
81
Id.
82
See Indrajit Basu, Social Media Elevates Community Policing, DIGITAL COMMUNITIES (Aug. 6, 2012),
http://www.digitalcommunities.com/articles/Social-Media-Elevates-Community-Policing.html (last visited
Sept. 23, 2014).
83
This idea was first proposed in the previous Mississippi Delta Project report on Helena, Crime
Reduction in Helena, Arkansas: Analysis and Recommendations, at p. 10.
84
Chad Day and Cathy Frye, Audit: More work needed in Phillips County courts, ARKANSAS DEMOCRATGAZETTE (Sept. 8, 2012, 4:15 AM), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2012/
sep/08/audit-more-work-needed-phillips-county-co-20120908/.
85
Chad Day and Emily Walkenhorst, Phillips County drops 197 felony cases, ARKANSAS DEMOCRATGAZETTE (June 21, 2012, 6:02 AM), http://m.arkansasonline.com/news/2012/jun/
21/phillips-county-drops-197-felony-cases-20120621/.
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pending had increased by 43% from the beginning of 2013.86 This chronic backlog puts
pressure on the courts to clear cases from their dockets by any means possible. Judges
and prosecutors may be tempted to support dismissals in order to ease this backlog,
even if such actions create an uneven application of justice or allow criminals to remain
on the streets. As a result, the public may perceive the courts to implement justice
unevenly or sporadically. As with public perception of law enforcement, a decline in
public perception of the courts could lead citizens to underreport crimes. The
combination of underreported crime and dismissals of cases without trials would
contribute to Helena’s crime crisis. As it becomes apparent that the justice system
cannot handle Helena’s problems, the community will lose faith in the criminal justice
system’s ability to uphold the rule of law.
In conjunction with this heavy backlog, court documents commonly and continually have
been mismanaged. For example, in the midst of a backlog on the traffic docket, a
Phillips County District Court judge recently dismissed 20 DWI charges because current
City Attorney Chalk Mitchell could not find the case files.87 In other instances, large
numbers of cases were reported to have been voluntarily dismissed. In interviews, one
court official asserted that defendants whose cases had been dismissed claimed to
have “worked it out” with the former city attorney.88 The city attorney never informed the
court of these arrangements. While no formal misconduct charges have ever been
brought against Helena’s former city attorney or prosecutor, these arrangements, made
possible by the combination of a heavy backlog and file mismanagement in Phillips
County, further perpetuate a lack of transparency and fairness in the system and only
serve to foster more public distrust.
Helena’s high crime rate, history of case mismanagement, and past exposure to public
corruption call for more enduring changes to the way the courts manage their caseload.
A study by the National Center for State Courts on the causes of judicial efficiency
found that “both speed and backlog are determined in large part by established
expectations, practices, and informal rules of behavior of judges and attorneys.”89
According to one court official, “When a case doesn’t go through the system properly,
there’s a lot of revenue lost.”90 Cases that are voluntarily dismissed through out-of-court
arrangements waste county resources on preliminary hearings but do not recoup those
costs through the fees and fines that would be realized in a case carried to its
conclusion in the courts. Improved caseflow management can save time and resources
86

ARK. JUDICIARY, SUMMARY OF FIRST CIRCUIT ACTIVE CRIMINAL CHARGES DURING THE DATES OF
01/01/2013–12/31/2013 (2014), available at
https://courts.arkansas.gov/sites/default/files/tree/1st%20Circuit%20Criminal_0.pdf.
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Chad Day and Cathy Frye, No files, so court dismisses 20 cases, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (Jul.
10, 2012, 5:11 AM), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2012/jul/10/no-files-so-court-dismisses-20cases-20120710/.
88
Interview in Helena-West Helena, Ark. (Mar, 27, 2014), notes on file with the Mississippi Delta Project.
89
THOMAS CHURCH ET AL., JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS, NAT’L CTR.
FOR STATE CTS, 54 (1978).
90
Chad Day and Cathy Frye, Dearth of funds hinders justice, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (May 20,
2012, 5:28 AM), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2012/may/20/dearth-funds-hinders-justice20120520/.
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and increase public trust in the court. The Phillips County circuit and district courts can
improve their caseflow management systems by (1) increasing the capacity of its
personnel, (2) providing adequate training to personnel, and (3) enacting caseflow
standards.
B. Recommendations
i. Increase Capacity of Personnel
a. Appointing a Court Manager or Case Coordinator

The Phillips County courts can improve caseflow management by increasing capacity of
personnel either through hiring new staff or investing in professional development for
current staff. If the courts do not already have a court manager or case coordinator,
hiring one or repurposing current staff could improve courtroom accuracy and efficiency.
In typical caseflow management models, the judge and the court manager or case
coordinator work together to develop and implement a deliberate approach to caseflow
management.91 The case coordinator helps the judges to monitor the progression of
cases and keep them on schedule from filing through post-disposition. The case
coordinator can also keep track of record submissions, manage the judge’s trial
schedules, and measure the court’s caseflow performance.
Courts throughout Arkansas have hired court managers and reaped the benefits.
Arkansas’ 19th East Judicial Circuit, which covers Carroll County, has had a court
manager since 2011.92 According to a case study of the 19th East Circuit, “[a]ggressive
caseflow management . . . provides timely dispositions of cases and due process to
litigants.”93 The results support this conclusion. Despite having only a single judge and
dealing with a caseload comparable to the one in Phillips County, the 19th East Circuit
has dealt with cases much quicker than the Phillips County Circuit Court. For example,
at the end of 2013 only 17% of the criminal charges on the 19th East Circuit’s docket
had been pending for more than two years.94 In contrast, 48% of the criminal charges
on the Phillips County Circuit Court’s docket had been pending for more than two years.
Neighboring St. Francis County, whose Circuit Court hired a court manager seven years
ago, saw similar results. At the end of 2013, only 30% of the criminal charges on St.
Francis County’s docket had been pending for more than two years.
b. Provide Caseflow Management Training for Personnel

91

See Richard B. Hoffman, Beyond the Team: Renegotiating the Judge-Administrator Partnership, 15
THE JUST SYS. J. 652, 658 (1991).
92
Berryville woman a graduate of court management program, CARROLL COUNTY NEWS (Sept. 3, 2011),
http://www.carrollconews.com/story/1759063.html.
93
NADINE HOLLAND, IRREDUCIBLE COMPLEXITY: THE WORKLOAD OF A ONE-JUDGE COURT, INST. CT. MGMT.,
39 (2014), available at
http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Education%20and%20Careers/CEDP%20Papers/2014/The%20
Workload%20of%20a%20One-Judge%20Court.ashx
94
ARK. JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL CIRCUITS FROM 01/01/2013 THROUGH 12/31/2013 — NINETEENTH CIRCUIT
EAST, available at https://courts.arkansas.gov/sites/default/files/tree/
19th%20E%20Circuit%20Criminal.pdf.
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Even if courts already have a court manager or comparable staff that focus on records
and caseflow management, it is still possible to optimize this position by taking
advantage of existing professional development programs that can train staff in best
practices and help them introduce more efficient systems to the court. Trainings help
case management staff develop skills and knowledge that are necessary for improving
case flow management. Typically, the training curriculum covers topics such as the
fundamental concepts in case flow management, technology, leadership, and human
resources. A number of universities and organizations offer training programs that give
participants the opportunity to become certified upon program completion.
A new court manager would benefit from entering the Arkansas Court Manager
Program.95 Offered by the Arkansas Judiciary’s Administrative Office of the Court, the
Court Manager Program trains court managers in the fundamental principles of
caseflow management; methods used to manage technology projects, human
resources, and financial resources; and the use of CourTools, a software package
created by the National Center for State Courts (“NCSC”) to help courts measure
performance.96 The program consists of six 2.5-day seminars spread over three years.
The seminars are held in Little Rock, and program costs consist of a $150 tuition fee as
well as travel, lodging, and eating expenses. The next rotation of seminars will begin in
June 2017.97 The Carroll County court manager, discussed above, graduated from the
Arkansas Court Manager Program in 2011. As of May 2014, 70 of Arkansas’ 121 Trial
Court Assistants had participated in this program.98
Other educational programs also exist and may be worth consideration depending on
the courts’ needs and the background of the court personnel. American University’s
Justice Programs Office offers a one-week, 30-hour certificate program. Main courses
include Judicial System Administration and Technology Applications to the Justice
System.99 Organizations such as the Justice Management Institute, located in Arlington,
Virginia, offer training workshops that range in length from sixty minutes to two days.100
Alternatively, NCSC offers certification courses that can be completed entirely online.
Some courses offer certification in the Certified Court Management Program and cost
$595, while others do not offer certification but can be taken for free. All courses may be
taken at any point during the three months following registration.101
95

See Court Management Program, ARK. JUDICIARY, https://courts.arkansas.gov/
administration/education/court-management-program (last visited July 9, 2015).
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CourTools: Giving the Courts the Tools to Measure Success, COURTOOLS
http://www.courtools.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CourTools/CourTools_Trial_Implementing_CourTools.a
shx (last visited July 9, 2015).
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Judicial Branch Education Calendar 2015, ARK. JUDICIARY, https://courts.arkansas.gov/
sites/default/files/JudicialBranchEducationCalendar2015.pdf (last visited July 9, 2015).
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HOLLAND, supra note 93, at 40.
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Certificate Program, AM. U. SCHOOL OF PUB. AFF., http://www.american.edu/spa/jpo/certificate.cfm (last
visited Dec. 31, 2014).
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In addition, a wealth of resources for case management personnel are available online
for free or a nominal fee. For instance, the National Association for Court Management
(“NACM”) offers free recordings of sessions from management conferences. In addition,
members of the NACM have access to published periodicals such as the Court
Manager and the Court Express.102 The National Center for State Courts also offers an
extensive list of free resources for case management staff. The resources range from
reports on best practices and recommendations for court management to studies on the
implementation of electronic recordings in court systems.103
If caseflow management personnel are unable to participate in the Arkansas Court
Manager Program or another formal certification program, then the personnel still would
benefit from reviewing some combination of free online courses and resources. For
example, staff members who wish to expand their management skills could review
NCSC’s online course entitled “A First Course in Effective Supervision”104 and any of
the caseflow management guides available on NCSC’s website.105 While the benefits of
in-person instruction and certification should not be discounted, these resources may
help acquaint court personnel with helpful concepts like improving communication and
teamwork within the court system and monitoring court performance. Court personnel
can use these concepts to improve caseflow management in the Phillips County courts
without incurring significant expenses.
ii. Implement Caseflow Standards

Once court personnel have become acquainted with the basic concepts of caseflow
management, they should develop standards to guide their implementation of caseflow
management. If executed properly, these standards lead to “a faster, more costeffective, and higher quality trial court process in [the] court.”106 Standards that a court
can employ to increase the efficiency of its case management system include early
court intervention, differentiated case management, fixed trial dates, and data
collection.107
a. Early Court Intervention

Early court intervention and continuous case control require the court, not the parties, to
take responsibility for the progress of cases from filing through post-disposition. Early
court intervention generally involves proactive management of the pretrial process in
order to reduce the amount of time between filing and disposition. Courts practicing
102

Resources, NAT’L ASS’N FOR CT. MGMT., https://nacmnet.org/resources/index.html (last visited July 9,
2015).
103
Caseflow Management Resource Guide, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS.,
http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Court-Management/Caseflow-Management/Resource-Guide.aspx (last visited
July 9, 2015).
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105
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 103.
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(2008).
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See id. at 3.
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early court intervention may require counsel to schedule preliminary hearings or status
meetings or even jointly present a discovery/case management plan to the court. A
study of 37 trial courts concluded that early case intervention by the court correlates
with shorter case times overall, reducing costs to both the parties and the court.108
Another study found that courts practicing early court intervention reduced the amount
of time to disposition by 1.5 to 2 months for cases lasting at least nine months.109 The
court manager then can maintain continuous control of cases through periodic case
reviews. This proactive approach to controlling litigation enables courts to reduce case
processing times. For example, faced with demographic shifts and a growing caseload,
in the early 1990s the circuit court in Fairfax, Virginia, implemented a form of early court
intervention called a structured delay reduction program.110 Under this program, the
court controlled the pace of litigation by checking in on the status of the case within 50
days after initial filing, holding a status conference within 100 days after filing during
which the judge assigned the case to a differentiated case management track, and
setting a limit on the date on which the trial may occur. As a result of these changes, the
court was able to reduce its backlog to manageable levels by 1996 despite a growing
volume of cases.111
The Phillips County courts can adopt an early intervention standard and tailor it to their
specific needs. While the individual manifestations of an early intervention standard may
vary based on a court’s individual circumstances, courts adopting this standard share a
common philosophy of proactively guiding cases from filing to disposition. All courts can
take charge of cases at the beginning of the process by scheduling meetings with
counsel to work out a timeline for the case. Depending on Phillips County’s individual
needs, the courts could build 50-day “check-ins” into the timeline in order to ensure that
counsel are on track to be ready for the scheduled trial date. If the courts identify
discovery as a common cause of unnecessary delay in their cases, they could require
counsel to plan and establish parameters to limit discovery. Such tactics can help
Phillips County proactively manage its caseload.
b. Differentiated Case Management

Differentiated case management (“DCM”) enables courts to structure their time more
efficiently by managing cases according to their complexity. In a traditional system,
courts treat all cases alike procedurally and generally address cases in the order they
are filed. Through DCM, the court determines upfront the amount of attention each case
is going to need and applies an appropriate timetable.112 Some courts have pre-defined
tracks based on whether the case is going to require conferences and hearings, or even
108
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more additional attention.113 The Fairfax County Circuit Court mentioned above
assigned cases to one of two tracks.114 Cases presenting complex legal issues or that
demand lengthy discovery periods were assigned to a “complex cases” track. For these
cases, the track mandated a number of pretrial stages, including a mandatory
settlement conference. However, the judge exercised discretion to set completion dates
for each pretrial stage. This enabled the court to tailor the track to the specific
complexities of the case. All other cases were assigned to a standard track with
predetermined dates for each pretrial stage. Other courts’ experiences have
demonstrated the benefits of adopting DCM. In the first year after adopting DCM for
criminal cases, courts in Pierce County, Washington, resolved 88% of their drug cases
within 90 days.115 In the prior year, Pierce County courts had resolved only 11% of their
drug cases within 90 days.116 Similarly, courts in St. Paul, Minnesota, reduced their
pending civil caseload by 94% within 8 months of adopting a DCM program.117
Phillips County can develop an effective DCM program in order to allocate court
resources appropriately among routine and complex cases. The courts can identify their
“typical” cases and establish a preset timeline that would be appropriate for typical
cases. The courts then can implement and enforce this track for most of their cases,
saving them time from developing case timelines on a case-by-case basis. Separately,
the courts can identify kinds of cases that usually require a longer timeline and either
assign them to a separate track for complex cases or evaluate their needs on a caseby-case basis. By determining these approaches ahead of time, the Phillips County
courts can establish expectations of timeliness and efficiency among court participants
and save court resources by preventing case-by-case timeline planning and
unnecessary continuances.
c. Fixed Trial Dates

Setting fixed trial dates and limiting continuances is another way to allow parties and the
court to operate more efficiently. Under this policy, the court establishes fixed trial dates
at the outset and grants continuances only in exceptional circumstances. Fixed trial
dates create expectations among prosecutors, counsel, and other trial participants that
the trial will occur when scheduled. If the court fails to support this expectation by
allowing trial dates to slip, case participants “will not be prepared” for trial and will
continue to request unnecessary continuances.118 Enforcing this expectation enables
the court to eliminate unnecessary continuances and shorten the amount of time it takes
to resolve a case.
The Fairfax County Circuit Court in Fairfax, Virginia, adopted this strategy to manage a
growing civil caseload in the 1980s. The court implemented a fixed trial date plan in
113
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order to control the amount of time it took the court to process its cases. The plan
required trials for all standard cases to occur within a year of filing and trials for complex
cases to occur within 18 months of filing.119 In order to meet these goals, the circuit
court administrator proactively managed cases’ progress.120 The court exercised
increased control over discovery, required status conferences to be held by the
hundredth day after filing, and required the parties to hold settlement conferences.121
These processes enabled the court to aim for fixed trial dates and limit the need for
continuances. As a result, the court increased the percentage of civil cases resolved
within one year from 50% to 78%.122
Given that the Phillips County courts are in session for only a few weeks each year,
they may benefit greatly from a combination of adherence to preset trial dates
determined by the case’s complexity and strict limitation of continuances. By using fixed
trial dates, the courts can identify the court session, date, and time at which the trial will
occur. This predictability enables courts to rely on their calendar and schedule other
court dates with greater certainty, increasing efficient use of judges’ time. The courts
can also adopt a policy of granting continuances only when absolutely necessary. The
limitation of unnecessary continuances will enable courts to more accurately predict
demand on and eliminate waste of court resources. By uniting these policies, courts like
the Fairfax County Circuit Court have created a cascading effect where time saved on
each case enables the court to more quickly address the next case. When cases are
addressed predictably and efficiently, courts also capture fines and fees that are lost
through out-of-court arrangements and reduce opportunities for abuse of the justice
process among law enforcement, prosecutors, and defendants. By adopting fixed trial
date policies, the Phillips County courts can address its ongoing problem with cases
pending for long periods of time by resolving cases more quickly and enabling the
courts to address new cases more promptly.
d. Data Collection

Courts practicing case management often collect and analyze data in order to assess
their ability to move cases through the justice system in a timely manner. Courts
measure both the amount of time between filing and disposition and the size and age of
their caseload.123 Tracking these metrics enables courts to assess the current status of
their caseloads and create realistic, achievable goals for improving court processes and
procedures. These procedural improvements help courts reduce waste of their
resources, shorten their dockets, and ensure that every case is resolved in accordance
with the law. Many courts use CourTools, an online software application, to track their
progress according to metrics including clearance rate, time to disposition, age of active
pending caseload, trial date certainty, and reliability of case files.124 Once caseflow
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management standards are in place, courts can use CourTools to determine their
current performance, the areas in which they would like to focus performance
improvements, and performance targets. Taking these steps enables courts to monitor
the effectiveness of implemented changes to their case management systems and
make changes to their implementation of caseflow management training and standards
as needed.
The Phillips County courts should consider adopting CourTools in order to evaluate their
progress as they develop and implement case management strategies. CourtTools will
help the courts track changes in lengths of time to disposition and caseload size in an
objective manner. As part of its overall adoption of caseflow management principles and
strategies, the Phillips County courts could use data collection to assess where
improvement is most needed and then track its improvement along objective metrics.
Data collection also may help the courts identify areas of the justice process that are
most vulnerable to abuse by prosecutors or defendants. Moving forward, the courts can
also use data collection both to assess its improvement internally and as objective
criteria in announcing its improvements to the community. Collecting and sharing data
will also further promote transparency while may help increase public trust in the courts.
C. Final Recommendations

Phillips County’s chronic backlog of cases not only delays justice but it also enhances
growing public distrust in the criminal justice system. The Phillips County courts would
benefit from a systematic strategy aimed at integrating caseflow management into the
courts’ daily operations. This report recommends that the courts take the following
steps:
1. Hire court managers for the Phillips County Circuit Court and the Phillips County
District Court. If sufficient funds cannot be found for two court managers, the
courts could discuss sharing personnel. The courts could also reassign current
personnel if the personnel have sufficient capacity to take on new
responsibilities.
2. Train personnel to acquaint them with caseflow management principles and
strategies. Court managers should enroll in the Arkansas Court Manager
Program. If personnel will be unable to attend the program, then the courts
should consider enrolling the personnel in online certification courses. If these
options are not financially feasible, personnel should review the free courses and
materials available through NCSC.
3. Implement caseflow management standards. These standards should focus on
enabling the courts to establish proactive control of cases through the following
tactics:
a. Early case intervention, including requiring counsel to schedule
preliminary hearings or status meetings and/or jointly present a
discovery/case management plan to the court;
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b. Differentiated case management, including developing pre-determined
tracks for “normal” and “complicated” cases and creating a system to
assign cases to these tracks at the time of filing;
c. Setting fixed trial dates and limiting continuances; and
d. Using CourTools to track court performance data, including the amount of
time between filing and disposition and the size and age of the court’s
caseload, adopt CourTools.

III. Judicial Ethics Recommendations
Trust in the judicial system is not solely a technical matter of training and establishing
effective court processes. Judges must apply the law fairly and consistently if the law is
to be respected and enforced. The Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct has affirmed
this, declaring that judges must discharge their duties “fairly and impartially.”125 To
protect this ideal of an impartial judiciary, the Arkansas Constitution protects a party’s
right to disqualify a judge who has an interest in the outcome of the proceeding.126
In light of the importance of the judicial branch to maintaining rule of law and public
trust, the potential for distrust of the judicial branch in Helena is particularly troubling.
For example, Helena sitting Phillips County Circuit Court Judge L.T. Simes has been
repeatedly sanctioned over the course of the last eight years, but he has retained his
position on the bench.127 Moreover, recent corruption scandals involving other Arkansas
judges underscore the contribution that Arkansas’ judicial ethics rules and its system of
judicial elections make to the perception that local courts are corrupt. This is not an
abstract concern: lack of trust in the Phillips County judiciary contributes to the bigger
problems with law enforcement that are described elsewhere in this report. As one
Helena official noted, “[i]f [people] don’t trust the law, [they] don’t trust the prosecutors,
[they] don’t trust the courts,” the law will not be widely respected and cannot be widely
enforced.128
In order to bolster the integrity of the judiciary and the public’s trust in the rule of law,
this report suggests three amendments to the Arkansas Code of Judicial Ethics. First,
additional rules regarding recusal and disqualification of judges who have received
campaign contributions from a party, lawyer, or law firm appearing before them should
be adopted. Second, there should be restrictions on judges’ ability to appoint substantial
campaign donors to administrative positions. Third, additional reporting requirements for
judges receiving gifts should be adopted.
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It is important to note, however, that changes to the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct
must be approved by the Arkansas Supreme Court.129 Therefore, it will be more difficult
to make changes to the judicial code than it would be to pass a local ordinance or make
other reforms at the city or county level. Since the recent passage of Amendment 80,
which introduced non-partisan judicial elections, the majority of changes to the Code
have been in the judicial campaign sections.130 Because Arkansas has only rarely made
changes like the ones recommended in this section, and such changes must apply
statewide, altering the Phillips County justice system is likely to be a statewide battle.
A. The Problem of Judicial Elections

Arkansas is one of the many states in which judges are chosen by popular election
rather than appointed by another branch of government.131 This is true for judges at
every level of the judicial branch: Supreme Court justices are elected to their seats in a
statewide election, judges on the Court of Appeals are elected within the district they
serve, and Circuit Courts are elected at the most local level.132 Judicial elections in
Arkansas are “non-partisan,” which means that judges may not run as a member of a
political party,133 and judges and justices may not run for non-judicial office.134 They are
not subject to term limits.
Many scholars have noted the tension between the ideal of an impartial judiciary and
judicial elections.135 Judges may be influenced by the effect that their decision in a
particular case would have on reelection. One recent study of criminal sentencing
practices found that Kansas judges increased incarceration rates for black defendants
by 10% in election years.136 Moreover, because elections are expensive, campaigning
requires that judges and justices raise substantial funds—first to run for an initial seat,
and then to run periodic reelection campaigns.137 The same individuals donating to a
judge’s reelection fund may—and, in fact, are likely to—then appear as a party or
advocate before that judge.
Recent events in Arkansas validate the concern that campaign contributions may
corrupt the state’s judiciary. On January 9, 2015, former Circuit Judge Mike Maggio pled
129
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guilty to accepting bribes – through campaign contributions – and allowing those bribes
to influence his judicial decisions.138 In particular, Judge Maggio admitted to reducing a
$5.2 million verdict against a nursing home because he had received campaign
contributions from the nursing home’s owner.139 The scope of the problem is not limited
to Judge Maggio. Three of the seven Arkansas Supreme Court Justices—Rhonda
Wood, Robin Wynne, and Karen Baker—have accepted campaign contributions from
the same nursing home owner.140 These events underscore the potential dangers that
judicial elections create and highlight the importance of having reliable safeguards
against corruption.
B. Recusal and Disqualification Amendment

If judges are biased in favor of or against one of the parties in front of her, they should
not hear the case. Under the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are required to
disqualify themselves (this is called “recusal”) when their “impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.”141 The main guiding document for judicial ethics is the Arkansas Code
of Judicial Conduct, which establishes ethical standards that form the basis for
disciplinary proceedings by the Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability
Commission.142 Under the amorphous standards provided, judges have a huge amount
of discretion to decide whether a conflict is significant enough to trigger disqualification.
The lack of concrete guidelines for judges, coupled with the Code’s reliance on selfpolicing, is not only a problem for judges who are actively compromised. It would be
difficult for a judge to make an accurate assessment of her own impartiality. If a judge
does not voluntarily recuse herself, a party may file a motion for disqualification to
request that another judge hear the case. However, because a party may not even be
aware of the conflict of interest or whether it is sufficient to justify disqualifying a judge,
relying on litigants to police judges will likely result in under-enforcement. Additional
concrete standards and reporting requirements to determine when judges should seek
recusal, and when litigants can seek disqualification, would help address these
problems.
Some states have adopted recusal rules that specifically address the situations in which
a campaign donation poses a potential threat to the integrity of legal proceedings. Most
of these rules were adopted within the last five years, following a U.S. Supreme Court
case in which the Court strongly recommended that states pass their own laws
governing judicial ethics and campaign contributions.143 For example, in Tennessee and
Oklahoma’s judicial codes, judicial recusal is required when a party has donated a high
enough amount to a judge’s campaign that the judge’s impartiality might be “reasonably
138
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questioned” because of it.144 Other states require recusal when a party has donated
more than a specific dollar amount.145 (The amount ranges from $50 (Utah to $2,500
(New York)).146 In 2014, Alabama passed a law creating a “rebuttable presumption” of
mandatory recusal where one party in the case raised more than a certain percentage
of total contributions to a judge during an election cycle (10% for a Supreme Court
Justice, 15% for a circuit court judge, and 25% for a district court judge).147 ABA Model
Rule 2.11(A)(4) calls for the recusal of a judge from a case when one of the parties in a
case have contributed above a specific aggregate amount to the judge’s campaign.148
In contrast, the only Arkansas rule providing specific guidance for recusal when a party
has donated to a judge’s campaign is an anemic comment to Rule 2.11 of its Code of
Judicial Conduct. The comment notes that the fact that a lawyer or party contributed to
a judge’s election fund “does not itself disqualify the judge” but acknowledges that such
donations “may raise questions as to the judge’s impartiality.”149 Thus, Arkansas judges
have significant discretion when deciding whether to recuse themselves or grant a
motion for disqualification, and they may be disinclined to acknowledge that their
impartiality has been compromised.
Adopting a version of the Model Rule 2.11(A)(4) into the Code of Judicial Conduct
would be one step in the right direction for Arkansas. In deciding upon this aggregate
amount, Arkansas can look to other states for guidance. In some states, where the
spending on judicial elections in relatively low, mandatory recusal can be required even
where the donated amount was relatively low (Utah’s $50 restriction is based on
application of the ABA rule)150 Alternatively, a more flexible approach, like the laws
creating a rebuttable presumption of mandatory recusal when one party is connected to
a major donor, could avoid potential “gamesmanship” or mandatory disqualification
where it is unnecessary. In February 2015, Arkansas House Representative John Baine
(D) introduced a bill, HB 1457, modeled after Alabama’s “rebuttable presumption” rule
for high-percentage donors to a judge’s campaign.151 The bill was withdrawn by its
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author on March 12, 2015, but it is still available online.152 If passed, this bill (or a similar
one that creates limits on the amount that parties or their lawyers can donate to a
judge’s election campaign) would be a step in the direction of addressing judicial
corruption.
It is also important to keep in mind that the ABA Model Rule and similar rules requiring
dismissal based on the contribution amount reach only direct campaign contributions,
not independent campaign expenditures. An amendment to Arkansas’ ethics code
should include these indirect contributions as well, to ensure that potentially corrupt
donors and judges cannot sidestep the ethics rules.
C. Administrative Appointments

In addition to their substantial power in deciding cases, judges also have the power to
make administrative appointments. Administrative appointments include potentially
lucrative or powerful positions like special investigators, administrative law judges, or
special fact-finders for a court. Just as the possibility of judges deciding cases based on
campaign contributions is a risk to a well-functioning, impartial judicial system, the
possibility of judges exercising their power to make appointments as a favor to
campaign donors risks turning the judicial system into an extended system of
patronage. If people are appointed to key administrative positions because of their
donations instead of their reliability or skills, the appointed individuals may not be wellsuited for the job.
Most state ethics codes, including Arkansas, have restrictions on the factors that a
judge can consider in making such an appointment; they must “avoid nepotism,
favoritism, and unnecessary appointments.”153 However, Arkansas judges are not
restricted under the administrative appointments ethics rules from appointing substantial
campaign contributors. Under ABA Model Rule 2.13(B), judges may not appoint
campaign contributors or their families to administrative positions, if those contributors
donated more than a specified amount in a given time frame.154 Adopting a rule like this
would help ensure that Arkansas judges could not hand out beneficial positions to their
patrons. This is likely to reduce both the actual occurrence and public perception of
corruption and induce more faith within the courts.
D. Gift Reporting Requirements

Campaign contributions are, of course, not the only method by which judges can be
improperly swayed. The Arkansas judiciary made news in 2013, for example, when it
was reported that an Arkansas Supreme Court justice, Justice Courtney Goodson, had
152

Id.
ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. § 2.13.
154
The Rule allows exceptions when either: (1) the position is substantially uncompensated; (2) the
lawyer is selected from a rotating list of qualified and available lawyers, unconnected to their political
contributions; or (3) if no other lawyer is available), MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.13 (2010),
available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_code_of_judicial_cond
uct.html
153

29
Published by eGrove, 2015

29

Delta Directions: Publications, Art. 20 [2015]

accepted a trip to Italy valued at $50,000 from a lawyer who argued frequently in the
Supreme Court.155 The same concerns about judges adjudicating cases involving
parties who donated heavily to their campaigns apply to judges adjudicating cases
involving parties who give gifts: their impartiality may be compromised or, at least,
called into question. Rulings from judges who are—or seem to be—indebted to one side
in a legal dispute are unreliable and untrustworthy.
Gifts to judges are not subject to the same reporting requirements that political
campaigns are; instead, judges are usually required under separate ethics rules to
report the gifts they receive to the public. The ABA Model Rule 3.13 for gift reporting
specifies how often and where a judge must report the amount and value of gifts
received, as well as information detailing the nature of any activity for which the judge
received compensation, the date of the activity, and a description of anything received
of value.156 In contrast, the Arkansas Code of Judicial Ethics only requires judges to
report the value itself of gifts they received. They are not required to provide a
description of the gift or corresponding information that verifies their report.157 These
loose reporting requirements allow actual and potential corruption to fly under the
state’s radar. Adopting additional requirements, such as the Model Rule 3.13, would
provide better guidance for judges as to gift reporting, as well as give them more factors
for consideration in determining the appropriateness of such gifts. Further, this reporting
will provide more oversight and supervision of judicial behavior in regards to these gifts
which will help to reassure the public that their judges are not up for sale.
E. Final Recommendations

Loose standard and limited reporting requirements in the Arkansas Code of Judicial
Ethics provide opportunities for potential and perceived corruption within the court. In
order to reduce these opportunities and promote optimal judicial behavior, it is
recommended that Phillips County advocate for the following revisions:
:
1. Adopt clearer, more stringent recusal and disqualification restrictions for judges,
specifically those outlined in ABA Model Rule 2.11(A)(4). In regards to
determining an appropriate aggregate amount, Arkansas Code of Judicial Ethics
can look to other states for guidance;
2. Adopt an amendment to current administrative appointment regulations that
restricts judges from appointing family members and campaign contributors.
This amendment could incorporate a complete bar on appointing both categories,
or, similar to ABA Model Rule 2.13(B), restrict the appointment of contributors
who have donated specified amounts within a pre-determined time frame;
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3. Adopt stronger reporting requirements for judicial gift reporting, as outlined in
ABA Model Rule 3.13.

Conclusion
Law enforcement and justice systems require public cooperation if they are to function
properly. When members of the community see the police as out-of-touch, corrupt, or
incompetent, they are less likely to report crimes or cooperate with law enforcement
practices. When the court system is inefficient and unreliable, the deterrent effect of
threatened prosecution is severely compromised. And, when the judicial system itself is
seen as compromised, and judges’ impartiality is in question, enforcing the rule of law is
difficult.
This report attempts to address the problems of distrust and corruption in Helena-West
Helena’s public institutions. Some of the solutions suggested—such as implementing
community policing and caseflow management techniques—can be implemented
quickly, while others—particularly the changes to the judicial ethics code—are longerterm goals that would require changes at the state level. Although reform presents
challenges, Helena stands to benefit by strengthening community trust in its institutions.
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